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It is a strange method of enforcing the law to say that an officer has
broken the law, and that we will punish him by excusing another wrongdoer. This makes society the ultimate loser. It would seem that a better
way to safeguard our constitutional rights would be to provide adequate
sanctions against the officer or official who obtains the evidence through
unlawful means, and trust that the courts which administer the law are
of such caliber that they will no more be inclined to turn their heads at a
violation of this kind than any other violation of the laws of the country.
HAROLD

E.

MEIER

THE ASSESSMENT AND COLLECTION OF THE COSTS
OF A CRIMINAL PROSECUTION IN WYOMING
Several states, including Wyoming, have enacted statutes which allow
the court to assess certain costs in a criminal prosecution if the defendant
is found guilty. At common law, costs as such were unknown in criminal
cases,1 therefore the basis for such assessment is statutory, and there can
be no liability for costs of prosecution in the absence of such authoriza2
tion.
A number of jurisdictions have advanced reasons why the costs of
prosecution should be assessed against the guilty party. An Arkansas
Court pointed out that the imposition of these costs is not intended as
part of the punishment, but it is a means of forcing the guilty to bear the
expense of their prosecution, rather than forcing the county or state to
bear such expense. 3 The Wyoming Supreme Court apparently agrees
4
with the Arkansas Court, for it said in Arnold v. State:
If we concede as we are inclined to do, that there is merit in the
philosophy that a convicted criminal should not be completely
relieved from paying certain items of the overall expense incident
to his being successfully prosecuted, that is a matter for legislative
rather than judicial determination....
At an earlier day Justice Stone of the Alabama Court took a somewhat
different view. He compared the liability for costs with such duties as
5
serving on a jury or posse.
There are two statutes in the State of Wyoming governing the assess1.
2.
3.
4

5.

Saunders v. People, 63 Colo. 241, 165 Pac. 781 (1917) ; Jenkins v. State, 22 Wyo. 34,
134 Pac. 260 (1913), reh. denied, 135 Pac. 749.
State v. Reed, 65 Mont. 51, 210 Pac. 756 (1922).
Edwards v. State, 12 Ark. 122 (1850).
.
Wyo ....
306 P.2d 368, 377 (1957).
Lee v. State, 75 Ala. 29 (1883).
"Certain duties are cast on all citizens for the
welfare of society; to serve on juries, to work the public roads, to testify as witnesses, to act as a posse comitatus, when thereto lawfully summoned, and when a
citizen, by his own misconduct, expose himself to the punitive powers of the law,
the expense incident to his prosecution and conviction, each and all of these may
result in subjecting the defaulter to a money liability."

NOTES

ment and collection of the costs of prosecution.

The first of these includes

a provision that ". . . in all cases of a conviction the court shall render
judgment against the defendant for the costs of prosecution."
The second
of these statutes provides for imprisonment for failure to pay such costs
7
of prosecution.
The main problem confronting the courts in applying the statute is
the meaning of the phrase "the costs of prosecution."
The decisions
disclose a variety of judicial interpretations.
The Wyoming Supreme
Court has considered this phrase in several cases. In Nicholson v. State,8
the jury failed to agree upon a verdict and a mistrial was declared in the
first proceedings. The defendant was tried again and the jury found him
guilty. The judge then imposed the costs of both trials upon the defendant,. The Supreme Court considered this a proper assessment because the
significant date for the assessment of the costs of prosecution was at the
time of final judgment when all prosecution ceases, and that time was
at the end of the second trial. In that case the claim was not made that
particular items were wrongfully assessed, but that the total taxation of
the costs of the first trial was wrongfully assessed. Thus the case did
not present to the Supreme Court the issue of individual items of cost.
The Wyoming Supreme Court placed another significant limitation
upon the definition of the phrase "costs of prosecution," in the recent case
9
of State v. Faulkner.
In that case a criminal information was filed against
the defendant charging forty-seven counts of embezzlement.
The jury
found the defendant guilty of only one count, nevertheless the lower court
assessed the entire cost of presenting the evidence on each and every count
in the information.
The Supreme Court held this to be an improper assessment of costs.
The court observed that had there been forty-seven different trials the
defendant would have had to pay only the costs of prosecution of the case
in which he was found guilty; therefore, where all those counts were
permissively joined in a single information, the assessed costs should bear
the same proportion to the total costs that the "guilty" verdict bears to the
total counts in the information at the beginning of the trial.
The court suggested two exceptions to -the rule cited above. First,
an exception might be made in situations in which the several offenses
charged grow out of the same acts or transactions, and secondly, in all
6.
7.

Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 9-105.
Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 9-108. "A person committed to jail for non-payment of fine
or costs or both, may be imprisoned therein until such imprisonment, at the rate
of one dollar ($1.00 a day) equals the amount of such fine or costs, or both, as
the case may be or the amount shall otherwise be paid, or secured to be paid,
when he shall be discharged." As originally enacted this statute contained a 60
day limitation upon imprisonment, however this limitation was excluded from
the statute in 1891.
8. 24 Wyo. 347, 157 Pac. 1013 (1916).
9. 75 Wyo. 104, 292 P.2d 1045 (1956).
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cases in which a verdict of "guilty" or "not guilty" (or a judgment of
dismissal) are based on substantially the same evidence. These two
exceptions, however, present a difficult problem of administration to the
courts. Whether particular evidence utilized in convicting the accused in
one crime would be the same evidence necessary to convict the defendant
of another crime arising out of the same transaction is a question requiring
close scrutiny of the evidence, and in the case of jury trial, requires the
judge to determine how the minds of the jury sifted the evidence. The
judge would also be required to determine whether a certain piece of
evidence could be utilized as convicting evidence on one count of the
information, and the same piece of evidence then be utilized to declare
the accused not guilty on another count of the same information in all
cases in which a verdict of "guilty" and "not guilty" (or a judgment for
dismissal) are based substantially on the same evidence.
In Arnold v. State'0 the court made a distinction between costs of
prosecution and the general expense of running a court system. In
determining the items included within the "general expense" of running
a court system, the Wyoming court followed the definition laid down by
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Eight Circuit, in Gleckman
v. United States." According to the case, jury fees, jury mileage, jury
bailiffs' fees and expenses are included among the general expenses of
maintaining the system of courts and the administration of justice. Such
expenses are an ordinary burden of government, and in the absence of
statute to the contrary may not be taxed against a convicted defendant
as costs of prosecution. Other holdings of Federal courts are to the
same effect, 12 and several states have reached the same result.' s
The constitutionality of Section 9-105 was first questioned in the case
of Jenkins v. State.' 4 The Supreme Court dismissed the issue quite summarily, stating that the constitutionality of these statutes had been
uniformly upheld. Other states are in accord with this holding, provided
that the cost statute was in existence at the time of the rendition of the
judgment.' 5
Despite the confident opinion of the Supreme Court in the Jenkins
case' 6 that "the constitutionality of these statutes has been uniformly
upheld," the recent Wyoming case of Arnold v. State'7 raises several
important considerations which render that conclusion open to serious
doubt.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

-

Wyo.
306 P.2d 368 (1957).
80 F.2d 394, 403 (8th Cir. 1935).
United States v. Wilson, 193 Fed. 1007 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911); United States v. Murphy,
59 F.2d 734 (D.Ala. 1932).
People v. Kennedy, 58 Mich. 372, 25 N.W. 318, 320 (1885); State v. Morehart, 149
Minn. 432, 183 N.W. 960 (1921); Saunders v. People, 63 Colo. 241, 165 Pac. 781,
782 (1917).
22 Wyo. 34, 134 Pac. 260 (1913), reh. denied, 135 Pac. 749.
State v. Dorland, 106 Iowa 40, 75 N.W. 654 (1898); Stout v. State, 91 Tenn. 405,
19 S.W. 19 (1892); State v. Hill, 72 Mo. 512 (1880).
Supra note 8.
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The first consideration raised is that of the relation that costs of prosecution should bear to the sentence of imprisonment and the fine imposed by
the court. In order to understand the situation, it is necessary to consider
the Arnold case in some detail.
Arnold was tried and convicted in the District Court of Carbon
County. That court assessed against. the convicted defendant as costs of
prosecution, the witness fees paid to two witnesses, amounting to $57.60,
service for two court bailiffs at $5.00 per day for 42 days totalling $46.00,
and mileage and per diem paid to all jurors on the jury panel and for
trial jurors who served on petit jury during the trial of that criminal
action, these jury fees amounting to $801.10. Thus the total assessment
of costs came to $904.70. The trial judge imposed a jail sentence for a
term of less than six months, and a fine of only $100, yet he evidently
found no disproportionate relation between the sentence and fine so
imposed and assessment of $904.70 as costs of prosecution. The trial court
did not wish to impose a jail sentence in excess of 6 months, yet according
to Wyoming Compiled Statutes § 9-108, this party, if he is unable to pay
the costs of prosecution, is subject to incarceration, at the rate of one
dollar ($1.00) per day, until the imprisonment equals the amount of such
fine or costs. This would mean an additional imprisonment of two and
one-half years beyond the six month sentencel
In another recent Wyoming case, State v. Alexander, 8 the District
Judge for Laramie County assessed costs of prosecution against the defendent amounting to $6,435.56. This large assessement of costs of prosecution raises the prospect of an interesting situation: Had defendant
allowed the judgment to stand without having appealed it, and had he
lived long enough to serve out his penitentiary sentence of 45 to 65 years,
and had he been released from the penitentiary- a very old and very poor
man, who had not as yet paid the costs of prosecution assessed against
him at the trial, he could be met at the penitentary gate by the Sheriff
of Laramie County, who could cause him to be incarcerated for an additional 18 years.
In addition to the inhumanity of proceeding in this way, such an
incarceration would at first blush appear to be an imprisonment for debt
and unconstitutional in violation of Article I, Section 5 of the Wyoming
Constitution. 19

However, the courts of other jurisdictions having con-

stitutional provisions similar to that of Wyoming have held that such
imprisonment is not an unconstitutional imprisonment for debt.

The

Washington Court reasoned that:
17.
18.
19.

Wyo ------306 P.2d 368 (1957).
State v. Alexander . --- Wyo-.......
324 P.2d 831 (1958).
Wyo. Const., art. I, § 5. "No person shall be imprisoned for debt except in case
of fraud."
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These costs are cast upon him as a penalty. They do not constitute strictly and simply a debt in the technical sense of the word
the fine imposed upon a party convicted of assault
any more than
20
and battery.
21
and Idaho. 22
Similar conclusions have been reached in Alabama
Both of these courts took the attitude that the provision referring to
imprisonment for debt only has application to debts arising out of contract.
Other jurisdictions have allowed a defendant to be incarcerated for failure
to pay the costs of prosecution where there was some statutory authorization for such imprisonment. The Iowa court has scrutinized closely the
legislative intent involved in assessing costs of prosecution under their
liquor code, 23 and under their motor vehicle code, 24 but it did not base
its decisions upon constitutional grounds. The Missouri court has discussed the statutory construction, and the legislative intent involved in its
statute allowing the assessment of costs of prosecution, and it has limited
25
it by strict statutory construction.
The second ground of doubt in connection with the off-hand holding
in Jenkins v. State,26 that the constitutionality of costs of. prosecution
statutes "has been uniformly upheld," involves the issue of whether such
imposition and collection of costs of prosecution directly or indirectly
deprives the defendant of his right to triil by jury.
In Arnold v. State27 Justice Harnsberger addressed himself to this
point in referring to the assessment of jury and bailiffs fees:
The right to jury trial in Wyoming is inviolate and may not be
hampered either directly or indirectly. . . .No one can say with
authority what measure of influence would be exerted in certain
circumstances by the prospect that should an accused be convicted
upon jury trial, he would be required to pay all expenses entailed
in providing him wth a jury when by pleading guilty he could
avoid such payment. Conceivably that might be such a deterrent
as would move an innocent person to plead guilty in some
cases and induce him to forego his constitutional right of trial
by jury.
Could not this argument be applied to the costs of prosecution, as well
as to the costs of juries and bailiffs? If a defendant were faced with a
strong case of circumstantial evidence against him, and the prosecution
were prepared to call a long list of witnesses to testify, thereby greatly
increasing the costs, then, in the words of the opinion," Conceivably that
might be such a deterrent as would move an innocent person to plead
Colby v. Backus, 19 Wash. 347, 53 Pac. 367 (1898).
Lee v. State, 75 Ala. 29 (1883) ; Ex parte John Hardy, 68 Ala. 303 (1880).
22. State v. Montroy, 37 Idaho 684, 217 Pac. 611 (1923).
23. State v. Van Klaveren, 208 Iowa 867, 226 N.W. 81 (1927).
24. State v. Gillman, 202 Iowa 428, 210 N.W. 435 (1926).
25. Ex parte Chambers, 221 Mo.App. 64, 290 S.W. 103 (1927).
26. 22 Wyo. 347, 157 Pac. 1013 (1916).
Wyo - --...306 P.2d 368, 377 (1957).
27.
20.

21.

NOTES

guilty in some cases and induce him to forego his constitutional right to
trial by jury."

28

Another argument against imprisonment for failure to pay the costs
2 9
of prosecution involves the right of the accused to due process of law.
Courts have placed themselves in a dilemma regarding the costs of
prosecution. Some courts hold that it is not a debt but is merely a compensatory measure. Other courts, however, maintain that it is part of
the penalty which he must pay and he will stand committed until it is
paid.3 0 When these costs of prosecution are placed in the category of
penal provisions (which penalty could be so extreme as to prevent the
accused from resorting to a court to determine his rights) then there may
31 "
be a violation of due process of law.
If the number of witnesses which might be called and the amount of
possible costs so great, that in comparing the possible costs to penalties,
it is so great as to prevent the accused from asserting his right to determine
his guilt or innocence before a court of law it may amount to a violation
of due process.
Due Process of Law has been defined as:
Due process of law in each particular case means, such an exercise
of the powers of the government as the maxims of law permit and
sanction, and under such safeguards for the protection of indifor the class of cases to
vidual rights as those maxims prescribe
32
which the one in question belongs.
Under the Wyoming statutes involving costs of prosecution there
appear to be no such safeguards for individual rights. There is no rational
relationship between the costs of prosecution which may be imposed, and
the severity of the crime. For example, the courts are not authorized to
impose costs in a trial for a speeding violation which could amount to
many hundreds of dollars if several witnesses were required to prove the
case. When viewed in the light of a punishment these costs seem so
totally unfair in relation to the crime as to shock the minds of ordinary
men. The court itself would not be justified in declaring the statutes
unconstituional in violation of due process, until such time as a judgment
for costs of prosecution, authorized by statute, imposed costs so excessive
and so unusual, and so disproportonate to the offense committed, as to
shock public sentiment and violate the judgment of reasonable people
33
concerning what is right and proper under the circumstances.
28.
29.

30.
31.
32.
33.

Ibid.
U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1: "No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
Ex parte Converse, 45 Nev. 93, 198 Pac. 229 (1921).
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 Sup.Ct. 441 (1908).
Cooley, Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 741 (8th ed. 1927).
People v. Magoni, 73 Cal.App. 78, 238 Pac. 112 (1925).

WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

When we consider the disproportion between punishments and the
costs of prosecution which Wyoming district judges have been willing to
assess, even as they have been trimmed down by the Arnold case, another
possible constitutional infirmity appears. There is a serious danger that
an assessment under these statutes might amount to a cruel and unusual
punishment. 34 When a court assesses a judgment for costs of prosecution
in a simple assault and battery case, which could require the accused to be
incarcerated for an additional three years beyond the six month actual
jail sentence, this seems a cruel and unusual punishment.
Courts of other jurisdictions have met this objection by stating that
it is no part of the penalty for the offense, but is instead merely a means
of compelling obedience to the judgment of the court. If the defendant
refuses to pay he is not sentenced to a term in prison; he sentences himself
to the incarceration. The duration of his imprisonment is in his own
control, 35 and by payment he can at any time secure his release. 36 These
jurisdictions consider it a proper means of collection of the costs of prosecution, and do not regard it as part of the punishment. They term it a
necessary means employed to carry out the judgment of the court, and a
partial renumeration to the state of the funds expended in the prosecution
of the convicted criminal. 37
In summary, several possible grounds of unconstitutionality have been
mentioned arising out of these two Wyoming statutes which allow the
assessment and collection of costs of prosecution. Justice Harnsberger in
Arnold v. State3" has suggested that it may be an indirect violation of the
right to trial by jury, a right which is inviolate in Wyoming. Because
of the lack of any rational relationship between the gravity of the crime
and the costs of prosecution which might be imposed for the most insignicant crime, there lies a possible violation of the due process clause. And
finally, there is the possibility that it may be a cruel and unusual punishment for a person to be forced to remain incarcerated long after his prison
term is fulfilled.
The Supreme Court of Wyoming has pointed out that it is a matter
for legislative rather than judicial determination, to determine the limitation which should be placed upon costs of prosecution. 39 One state, Illinois, has completely abolished the statute allowing incarceration for nonU.S. Const., Amend. VIII. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
35. Hart v. Norman, 92 Misc. 185, 155 N.Y.S. 238 (1929).
36. Gordan v. Johnson, 126 Ga. 584, 55 S.E. 489 (1906).
37. State v. Montroy, 37 Idaho 684, 217 Pac. 611 (1923); Colby v. Backus, 19 Wash.
347, 53 Pac. 367 (1898).
306 P.2d 368, 377 (1957).
38.
Wyo -......"If we concede as we are inclined to
306 P.2d 368, 377 (1957).
Wyo.
39 -........
do that there is merit in the philosophy that a convicted criminal should not be
completely relieved from paying certain items of the overall expense incident to
his being successfully prosecuted, that is a matter for legislative rather than for
judicial determination, bearing in mind that courts may ultimately be required
to pass upon the constitutionality of any such legislative action."
34.
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payment of costs of prosecution, and has replaced it with legislation which
specifically prohibits the imposition of such prison sentences for failure
to pay costs:
No person shall by any court be committed to the penitentiary, to
the reformatory for women, or40 to any other state institution for
the recovery of a fine or costs.
In view of the serious doubt as to the constitutionality of Sections
9-105 and 9-108, and the grave consequences they may produce if they are
constitutional, it is submitted that the Wyoming legislature should either
repeal these cost statutes, or repeal or limit the imprisonment statute.
On the whole it would seem preferable to allow Section 9-105 to stand and
to repeal Section 9-108.
JOHN

R.

SMYTH

TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Wyoming is one of the few states which has enacted a statute conferring on the courts the power to sever the parent-child relationship in a
special proceeding, styled "Judicial Termination of Parental Rights."
The Wyomiing statute1 is a progressive piece of legislation, closely patterned
after the Standard Juvenile Court Act, prepared by the National Probation
and Parole Association. 2 Wisconsin was one of the earliest states to adopt
such a proceeding.3 The California juvenile court law has a similar section. 4 The Wyoming Youth Council proposed the legislation with the
view toward establishing ". . . clear judicial authority for the final termination of parental rights in cases of non-support for more than one year
without just cause, abandonment, abuse or neglect. Thus, in flagrant
cases of unfit parents, the children may be placed in permanent adoptive
homes; the taxpayers are relieved of a financial burden; and there are
both humane and economic benefits." 5 Termination of parental rights
as comprehended by the draftsmen of the Wyoming statute must be
distinguished from the common usage of the phrase. For example, statutes
which dispense with consent of the parents in adoption proceedings where
abandonment is proven, have been spoken of as "terminating parental
rights." The effect of an adoption decree is said to "terminate parental
rights." Emancipation of a minor child through attainment of majority
or marriage is referred to as such a "termination." The new statute, however, envisages a possible severance of all the rights of a parent without
regard to the happening of any subsequent fact (such as attainment of
40.

Ill.
Rev. Stat. Chap. 38, § 802 (1951).

1.

Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 58-701 (Supp. 1957).

2.

Ibid.

3.
4.
5.

Wis. Stat. § 48.40 (1955).
Cal. Welfare and Institutions Code § 775 et seq.
Report of the Wyoming Youth Council (1955-1957 Biennium), p. r.

